Why Men Participate: A Review of Perpetrator Research on the Rwandan Genocide by Loyle, Cyanne E.
Journal of African Conflicts and Peace Studies
Volume 1
Issue 2 Genocide: Critical Issues Article 4
September 2009
Why Men Participate: A Review of Perpetrator
Research on the Rwandan Genocide
Cyanne E. Loyle
PhD candidate, University of Maryland, cloyle@gvpt.umd.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jacaps
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Tampa Library at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
African Conflicts and Peace Studies by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Recommended Citation
Loyle, Cyanne E. (2009) "Why Men Participate: A Review of Perpetrator Research on the Rwandan Genocide," Journal of African
Conflicts and Peace Studies: Vol. 1: Iss. 2, 26-42.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2325-484X.1.2.2
Available at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jacaps/vol1/iss2/4
Journal of African 'conflicts and Peace Studies 
WHY MEN PARTICIPATE: A REVIEW OF PERPETRATOR RESEARCH ON THE 
RWANDAN GENOCIDE 
Cyanne E. LOYLE 
Abstract: In "Why Men Parlicipate: A Review of Perpetrator Research on the Rwandan Genocide, " 
Cyanne E. Loyle provides a thought-provoking analysis of the existing state of the genocide perpetrator 
literature. Relying on fieldwork conducted in Rwanda over the past several years, her research 
contributes to the development of a unified theory of parlicipation in genocide (that is, who parlicipates 
and why) that can be examined and applied across case. 
Arguably the greatest crime a person can commit, genocide, never seems to be 
hindered by "a lack of willing executioners" (Waller 2001). Yet, participation in 
genocide has been difficult to explain. Why do certain people volunteer to kill their 
neighbors? How are others mobilized to attack their own families? When do some 
unwillingly participate in acts of violence? Put simply, why do certain people commit 
genocide? To date the existing litE)rature on genocide participation has been 
inconclusive, with the field of study split between psychology (Staub, 1989,Waller 
2002), 1981; 1985 anthropology (Hinton, 2005), political economy (Verwimp, 2005), 
public health (Adler et al. 2008b), sociology (Fein, 1990; Horowitz, 1981 ; and Kuper, 
1981 ; Kuper, 1985), and political science (McDoom, 2005; Straus, 2006; Fuji, 2009). 
This focus on explanations for participation across discipline has failed to produce a 
unified theory of participation that can be examined and applied across cases. 
Understanding why people participate in genocide could not be more important. 
Determining the motivations and conditions for participation in mass violence is 
essential for establishing patterns of prevention. Only by understanding the factors that 
facilitate participation will the academic and policy communities be able to identify 
potential perpetrators and work to restrict the mass participation that makes genocide 
possible. 
Herein, I provide a review of the genocide perpetrator and participation literature 
across field and synthesize the main hypotheses. I then go on to apply and test those 
predictions on participation in the context of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Through a 
more detailed description and evaluation of the Rwanda context I challenge some of 
the existing assumption:: of genocide participation and the applicability of this research 
across case. I conclude by proposing some avenues for future research in participation 
for both political science and genocide studies. 
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Why Participate in Genocide? 
The field of genocide studies has been consumed by a desire to understand why 
people participate in the crime of genocide. Conceived of as "how ordinary men 
become killers," what makes people "evil" and how some become "willing 
executioners," the concept of mass participation in extremely violent crimes is seen as 
the lynchpin for the future prevention of these atrocities. The sixty years since the 
Holocaust has not brought us any closer to these answers. In fact, the subsequent 
violence in Cambodia (1975-1979), the Former Yugoslavia (the 1990s), Rwanda 
(1994) and now Darfur (2003-present) has only further complicated our understanding. 
So why do people participate in genocide? 
For the purpose of this paper I define "perpetrating" genocide as the participation and 
intention to participate in a direct attack on a civilian with the intention to kill or harm 
(Straus 2004). While the legal definition of genocide requires that the intention of the 
act be the elimination in whole or in part of a particular group based on that individual's 
national, ethnic, racial or religious identity, individual acts of participation within a 
genocide need not be so intentional. To assume that violent participation is motivated 
by genocidal ideology assumes that all participants in genocide act for the same 
reason -- to perpetrate genocide. This need not be the case. 
Turning to the current literature, I review the theoretical reasons for participating in 
genocide. In addition to a survey of why people participate, I extrapolate predictions 
for who should participate and how people participate. 
Structural and Individual Theories of Participation 
Existing theories on genocide participation can be divided into two categories: theories 
relating to (1) structural factors, and those relating to (2) the individual. Structural 
theories involve institutional, cultural and situational explanations unique to a given 
society at a give time. Theories of the individual include explanations for participation 
that are unique to a given participant, for example, psychological deviance, group 
membership or personal life conditions. Both the structure and individual theories are 
further elaborated below. 
Structural theories for mass participation are well developed in the genocide studies 
literature. These explanations include characteristics of the state, characteristics of a 
given culture or a particular historical situation that can lead people to perpetrate 
genocide. Structural theories assume that context is essential for determining when 
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people will mobilize to commit genocide. Without the right structural context genocide 
would not be possible. 
Institutional explanations for participation are a subset of the structural theory which 
suggests that the structure of a state plays a role in shaping an individual's motivation. 
Here it is argued that state capacity and the institutional hierarchy of a particular 
country can infiuence levels of participation. Some countries, such as Germany and 
Rwanda, are argued to have a historical legacy of societal adherence to an 
authoritarian state (Harff, 2003). In other words, some states condition unquestioning 
"followers." Other states or communities refiect the presence of strong leaders 
(Valentino, 2004). Variations in the styles of community leaders and prior patterns of 
communal responses to ethnic tensions can affect an individual's desire or ability to 
participate in violence (Straus, 2006). If a powerful authority figure orders its followers 
to support a genocide, individuals are more likely to participate. Acceptance of 
violence by the state and leaders can also be a useful tool for legitimating genocide. 
State support makes genocidal violence a "legal" and non-deviant social behavior. 
Institutional explanations therefore argue that state authority and a societal adherence 
to that authority facilitates part.icipation in genocide by "legalizing" the act and 
commanding participation. 
Another structural explanation for participation is the characteristics of a given culture. 
Here certain cultures are more predisposed to genocidal violence than others. This 
explanation includes discussions of institutionalized racism (Charny, 1982), cultural 
anti-Semitism (Goldhagen, 1997) and the presence of deep social divisions (Kuper, 
1983). Cultural explanations argue that there are particular characteristics of a given 
cultural context that facilitates the participation in mass violence. These characteristics 
can lead an individual to place a different moral and social calculus on participation. 
The discussion of cultural context is particularly relevant in regards to the ability of 
elites to use dehumanization or differentiating tactics to facilitate violence. If a 
particular culture is already predisposed to the idea of an "other'' differentiation is 
easier and more likely. 
The situational context provides another structural explanation for participation in 
genocide. This explanation includes all contemporary events in the country at a given 
time. Historically, genocide has taken place in the environment of extreme domestic 
violence, civil or interstate war. The current situation in a country can alter group 
dynamics and an individual's calculus of safety, security and survival. Here an 
individual might be more likely to commit mass atrocities in a time of war because 
violence has already led to social and cultural breakdown. Conditions of violence 
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motivate individuals based on fear, self-defense, a desire to protect their family or 
loved ones and a desire to defend one's nation or homeland. 
Different from structural theories, individual explanations of genocide participation 
attempt to explain why a particular person would choose to participate in mass murder 
independent of the context. One possible explanation for individual participation is a 
psychological deviance within that person. Psychological deviance theories suggest 
that only "deviant" individuals participate in mass killing. According to psychological 
explanations, certain individuals may be more predisposed to participate in acts of 
violence; some individuals are more violent. This explanation tends to focus on the 
latent aggressive tendencies of single, young men. In addition to a pre-disposition, 
deviance can be cc;~used by a triggering event such as the attack on the Reichstag in 
the case of Nazi Germany or the crash of President Habyarimana's plane in Rwanda 
(Adler, et al. 2008b). Deviant participant theories are countered by the "ordinary men" 
hypothesis that suggests that it is regular people and not psychological exceptions 
who make up the bulk of participants. in genocide (Browning, 1993). 
Another individual explanation for genocide participation is group psychology. This 
theory suggests that there are unique characteristics of groups (both inclusion in and 
exclusion frorri) that facilitate particular behavior patterns (Staub, 1989). For example, 
being a member of a particular group can cause one to act in a way thaf is against his 
or her personal value structure. Also, the strengthening of out-groups and across 
group distinctions can lead to behavioral exceptionalism (Kuper, 1983). In this case, 
individuals treat members of different groups differently with genocidal violence as the 
extreme manifestation of this difference. In addition to treating the out-group 
differently, group members are also more likely to engage in violence if other members 
of their group are participating. Here a member of a particular group fears social 
sanctions and is more likely to participate if his or her community is already involved 
(Fujii, 2009). Stronger social structures within a given community will increase an 
individual's incentive to participate. 
Finally, an individual's life conditions are a possible explanation for participation in 
mass violence and genocide. If an individual is discontent with his or her personal 
situation, violence provides an opportunity to settle scores both emotionally and 
materially (Andre and Platteau, 1998). In addition, an individual's greed or perception 
of injustice could increase the likelihood of scapegoating manifested with violence 
(Staub, 1989). In the political science conflict literature this motivation is referred to as 
the expression of individual grievances. Here social class, economic and political 
grievances and personal dislocation and frustration are the primary motivations for 
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participation in violence. In this situation, participation is also more likely when private 
goods are offered to an individual (Lichbach, 1995). While theories of individual gain 
are not well articulated in the genocide perpetrator literature, existing conflict literature 
stresses the effectiveness of "selective incentives" in compelling individuals to violent 
action (Gurr, 1970). 
Both structural and individual theories generate predictions regarding the type of 
person who would participate in genocide. Below I draw out some of these predictions 
to evaluate who participates in genocide and how. 
Who Participates? 
Structural explanations argue that mass genocide participation is more likely in some 
states and cultures than in others. Authoritarian states with a history of violence are 
more likely to compel individuals to participate in mass violence through fear and 
coercion. Societies with a history of ethnic tension and social divisionism are more 
likely to compel genocidal acts through dehumanization and a legacy of the "other'' 
(Charny, 1982)). Preexisting ethnic tension in a society can also make violent 
mobilization easier. Deep divisions. within a given society make violence towards an 
out-group less morally challenging (Kuper, 1983). And finally, conditions of war 
facilitate a culture of violence that increases the likelihood of mass participation in all 
types of brutality. Countries already at war will be more likely to experience genocide 
than those at peace (Harff, 2003). 
Structural explanations provide a theory for the type of situation in which genocide 
participation would be more likely for all members of a given state or culture, but it 
does not explain why some individuals in that group participate while others do not. 
Individual explanations for participation suggest that participants in genocide have 
individual motivations to do so. Certain individuals could be more deviant than others. 
Here the literature focuses on single, young adult men, but the deviant psychology 
literature would also point to particular individuals who may have latent psychopathic 
tendencies. Grievance arguments would suggest that poor, under-educated and 
political disenfranchised people would be more likely to participate in violence. And 
finally, members of a political, cultural or social community that is already participating 
in the violence would also be more likely to join. 
Individual arguments concerning individual motivations suggest that even given the 
same institutional, cultural and situational structure, certain people are more likely to 
participate in mass violence than others. Structural and individual theories address 
why a person participates and subsequently who that person is most likely to be; 
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however, they fa il to address how a person is likely to engage in genocidal acts. 
Theoretical predictions regarding how people participate in genocide are not well 
developed in the current literature. Structural and individual theories of participation 
are used to predict who will commit an act of genocide i.e. who will participate. 
However, different people participate in mass violence in different capacities and at 
different levels. During the Holocaust, for example, most perpetrators participated in 
the genocide in uniform. In this example, people participated from the ranks of the 
German army, the Special Police or as concentration camp guards. This is a similar 
pattern to the violence in Cambodia and the Former Yugoslavia. Within these units 
people participated at varying levels and in various activities. Some members of tile 
Special Police in Germany, for example, were active and aggressive killers who were 
frequently put on the front line of killing squads. Others were less willing participants 
and engaged in genocidal activities with diminished zeal. There were even some who 
voluntarily withdrew from participating in violent acts against civilians (Gross, 2001 ). 
Structural and individual theories of participation can be used to predict who would 
show up in the first place, but not the level or activity in which the individual would be 
involved. 
Conclusions from the Theoretical Literature 
But which comes first, the structure or an individual 's motivation? Competing 
theoretical claims simultaneously argue that individuals would not participate in 
genocide without a given structural context and likewise a similar structural context will 
not elicit genocidal participation across all individuals. Below I examine existing 
theories of structural and individual explanations for participation in the case of the 
Rwandan genocide in an attempt to draw out these distinctions. Relying on existing 
surveys and interviews with genocide perpetrators in Rwanda, I look at the different 
ways that experiences in Rwanda adhere to and deviate from the predictions of 
existing theory. I then use the evidence from Rwanda to generate some additional 
hypotheses regarding participation in genocide. 
Participation in the Rwandan Genocide 
The indicators of the Rwandan genocide are both familiar and unique. Like other 
genocides of the twentieth century, the Rwanda genocide took place in a time of 
existing armed conflict (Harff, 2003). A civil war between the Rwanda government and 
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) had been raging from 1990 to 1992 and ended with 
the signing of the Arusha Accords. The RPF represented a group of Tutsi expatriates 
and refugees exiled in Uganda who were invading after a series of unsuccessful 
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negotiations regarding the right to return to Rwanda. The ceasefire and resulting . 
power-sharing agreement betwee·n the RPF and Rwandan government contributed to 
the rise of extremist factions within the political elite and army (Prunier, 1995). As with 
other genocides, these extremist factions used dehumanization propaganda and fear 
of the security threat from the RPF to incite violence and to consolidate political 
support. Because of the RPF invasion which began the civil war in 1990, Rwandan 
Tutsis were portrayed as an enemy of the Rwandan state. It therefore became a 
Rwandan 's duty and "job" to eliminate this threat. 
The Rwandan genocide emerged from an autocratic government, in a country with a 
history of ethnic tension. Genocidal violence began in April1994 with the death of the 
President Juvenal Habyarimana. His plane crash on April 6th signaled the start of the 
killings which lasted for approximately 100 days. The sheer scope and pace of the 
killing was startling and the patterns of violence varied across the country (Davenport, 
and Starn 2008). Over 800,000 people (upper bound estimates are closer to 1.2 
million), both Tutsi and Hutu political moderates, were killed in this three-month period 
(Commission pour le Memorial du Genocide, 1996). Early political killings were the 
responsibility of the National Police and Rwandan Army. Days later, local killings 
squads, both roving and community-based, were responsible for the majority of 
deaths. These squads, made up of trained local militia (lnterahamwe) and community 
recruits, manned roadblocks, performed door-to-door searches, and traveled through 
the country-side both seeking out victims and inciting violence in neighboring 
communities; Studies of recruitment and participation in the genocide highlight the 
hands-on nature of the killing in this conflict as well as the pattern of mass participation 
across the population. 
Existing research on participation in the genocide in Rwanda has consisted mostly of 
perpetrator interviews and prison surveys (Adler, et al. 2008a; Adler, et al. 2008b; Fuji 
2009; McDoom, 2005; Straus, 2004; Straus, 2006) . Unlike the previously referenced 
theoretical work on genocide participation, data on perpetrators in the Rwandan 
genocide rely almost entirely on these surveys and interviews with the Rwandan 
perpetrator population. Because of the unprecedented access granted to researchers 
by the Rwandan government, people have been able to gain entrance to prisons, 
perpetrator support organizations and reintegration facilities· in order to conduct this 
research. Of note are the research project by Scott Straus (2006), Lee Ann Fuji (2009) 
and Reva Adler et al. (2008) . The findings of this research are incorporated in the 
discussion below. 
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In addition to perpetrator specific work in Rwanda, there has been a recent attempt to 
map variations in the violence of the civil war and genocide across the country. The 
· work of Christian Davenport and Alan Starn (2008) suggests that there was extreme 
variation in the violence over the period of the 100 days. This variation in deaths and 
types of attacks suggests that there was also variation in the number of perpetrators in 
a given area, variation in who joined and variation in how they participated. These 
findings challenge some of the uniformity within the genocide perpetrator theo·ry and 
are also included in the analysis that follows. 
Below I use the Rwandan genocide to analyze the existing structural and individual 
theories of genocide participation. While I find support for much of the current work, 
the Rwandan genocide raises additional questions and potential hypotheses regarding 
participation that should be addressed in subsequent work. 
Structural and Individual Explanations for Participation in Rwanda 
So how does the Rwandan case further our understanding of existing theories of 
genocide perpetration? In Rwanda there were both structural and individual 
explanations for participation in the genocide. Rwanda was and is a highly authority-
focused society. In addition to the autocratic government at the time of the genocide, 
Rwanda has a history of adherence to authority and a tradition of participating in elite-
sponsored projects and community activities (Straus, 2006). In other words, Rwandans 
were accustom to following the directions of elites. However, most contemporary 
research on Rwanda does not find a blind adherence to authority, but rather 
perpetrators who are motivated by fear of those authorities (Adler et al., 2008; Straus, 
2006). Perpetrators of the genocide did not admit to following leaders for leadership 
sake, but rather confessed fear for their own safety and security for deviating from tile 
party position. 
The fear of punishment was a strong motivator for participants in the violence. In 
addition to being afraid of an impending RPF attack, perpetrators expressed fear of 
being associated with the invading forces. There was the fear that the failure to 
participate would be punished or sanctioned either by the authorities or by Hutu 
political extremists in the area. Because of the strong "enemy from within" vocabulary 
in Rwanda at the time, participants used their actions to distinguish themselves as 
active supporters of the current government and willingness to work in support and 
protection of the Nation (Adler et al. , 2008b). This motivation for participation 
demonstrates a more complicated relationship between Rwandans and state authority. 
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The fear of personal punishment and the desire to protect the state demonstrates both 
a reverence for authority and a legacy of a "punishing" autocratic state. 
Participants in the Rwandan genocide were also motivated by national leaders and 
community officials. Both Davenport and Starn (2008) and Straus (2006) find evidence 
of extreme variation in violence and participation across Rwanda. Variation in the 
authority and motivation of local leaders is one explanation for this difference. Some 
local government officials, for example, actively supported the genocide while others 
tried to pacify their communities and resist local violence as long as possible (Human 
Rights Watch, 1999). As structural theories suggest, leadership can be essential to 
determining an individual's or community's participation in violence. Variation in the 
genocide in Rwanda demonstrates that leaders and leadership structure in that 
country were able to influence participation in the genocide. 
In addition to the structure of authority and individual leaders in Rwanda, the 
situational context of the concurrent civil war created a need to defend self, family and 
nation that was brought on by a fear of the RPF invasion and its potential military 
victory. This fear was rooted in the apprehension that the Tutsi "invaders" meant to 
enslave and punish Hutu in Rwanda (Mamdani, 2002). Propaganda from the extremist 
government insisted that the advancing RPF army intended to kill the Hutu population 
(Melvern, 2006) . This fear was strengthened by both previous ethnic tensions in 
Rwanda (pogroms in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s) as well as ongoing ethnic violence 
between Tutsi and Hutu in neighboring Burundi.1 This fear lead to a need to defend 
and a motivation for participation that would not have been possible without the 
concurrent situational factors. 
Structural factors do not sufficiently explain participation in the Rwandan context. 
Individual theories are needed to explain why some chose to act in extremely violen t 
ways. Individual motivations for participation in the Rwandan genocide include 
personal edification and greed, group associations, and confusion and uncertainty. 
The explanation of personal edification and greed is similar to the broader theory of 
participation regarding an individual's life conditions. Group psychology and communal 
associations are also predicted in the literature. But the motivation of confusion and 
uncertainty does not map well onto existing explanations for genocide participation. 
There is also little evidence to suggest that culture or deviant behavior featured 
1 The context in Burundi was particularly relevant for southern prefectures in Rwanda which were 
influenced by an influx of Burundian refugees who both spread stories of the conflict and participated in 
the killing of Rwandan Tutsi (Human Rights Watch, 1999). 
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prominently in individual decisions to participate in the genocide. These motivations 
are discussed further below. 
Personal edification and greed was a common individual motivation during the 
genocide in Rwanda. Once the genocidal violence and conflict began, the general 
state of lawlessness was easy to exploit. Economic depravity and individual 
frustrations were voiced through large-scale looting of homes and community spaces. 
This looting was not limited to private homes. In Butare, heath centers and public 
offices were also looted (Human Rights Watch, 1999). Some Rwandans participated in 
the genocide in order to materially benefit from the violence. Beyond the personal 
benefits of looting, some individuals were also directly rewarded for their participation 
in ki llings. For example, in the Gikongoro area, Lt. Colonel Simba is purported to have 
made personal payments to individuals who assaulted Tutsi (Human Rights Watch, 
1999, p. 309). In addition to monetary gains, some perpetrators used the situational 
context of social breakdown to exercise other desires. Revenge killings unrelated to 
the genocide were commonplace in some communities. Sexual assault and forced co-
habitation was often the result of prior rejections (particularly of Hutu men by Tutsi 
women). A lack of governmental sanctions allowed for a social breakdown that 
encouraged participation for personal gain. 
Group associations also played a key role in determining which individuals participated 
in the genocide. Lee Ann Fujii (2009) finds that participation in the genocide in Rwanda 
was often the result of social network structures that were able to mobilize individual 
participants. Consistent with both the genocide studies and conflict literature, this 
finding suggests that social sanctions as well as group pressure and legitimation was a 
useful tool in mass mobilization. This finding would also explain some of the extreme 
communal variation found in Davenport and Stam (2008). Group associations provide 
a pseudo-social tipping point for participation. Once a large group is activated for 
participation , ranks quickly swell. 
Finally, some perpetrators admit feeling overpowered and confused by the situation. 
Adler et al. (2008) refers to this as the "tsunami effect," but this emotion is similar to 
the exclusion of individuals from the "universe of obligation" as described by Helen 
Fein (1984) . In this context, individuals were no longer certain of right and wrong. 
Morality was reversed and participating in the killing became "good" (Staub, 1989). 
Rwandans were unsure who to trust or believe and often acted along with the 
momentum of the collective. This motivation suggests that different from being willing 
to participate, some perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide did not stop to critically or 
morally evaluate their action, but rather were caught up in the momentum of the time. 
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Unlike a "deviant behavior" hypothesis, the tsunami explanation suggests that in an 
emotionally traumatizing time, some people were unable to distinguish the relevant 
moral universe (Fein, 1984). The individual admissions of convicted perpetrators are 
essential for understanding motivating factors, however, this research should be 
triangulated with additional material concerning who actually participated in the 
violence. 
Who Participated in Rwanda? 
Like most other forms of violent conflict, participants in the Rwandan genocide were 
primarily male. The rank and file were generally farmers -- like the majority of the 
Rwandan populations (Bhavnani, 2006; Verwimp, 2005), primarily poor and with 
medium levels of education (Straus, 2004) . Like the majority of the population at the 
time, the majority of perpetrators were literate (approximately 60%). In his survey of 
210 perpetrators from 15 different prisons in Rwanda, Straus (2006) finds that the 
demographics of participants in the genocide did not differ significantly from the 
demographics of the Rwandan population at the time. In an economic survey of land 
quality before the genocide, Verwimp (2005) finds that perpetrators did not own 
comparatively smaller farms, experience lower land productivity or have poorer soil 
quality than non-participants. These demographics lend support to an "ordinary 
Rwandan" hypothesis suggesting that there were few distinguishing characteristics of 
genocide perpetrators aside for the predominance of men. 
Perpetrators in Rwanda were disproportionately made up of non-combatants. While in 
the case of the Holocaust and the massacre at Srebrenica (the so-called safe haven in 
the former Yugoslavia, 1995) participants were primarily uniformed combatants, in 
Rwanda local community members with no previous history of military involvement 
were incited to violence. That is not to say that all participants in the Rwandan 
genocide were without institutional or group affiliation. While not an official military 
branch, the lnterahamwe was trained and funded by political elites in Rwanda. 
Training of the lnterahamwe took place as early as 1992 in some areas outside the 
capital city, Kigali. Early participation in the lnterahamwe was almost entirely voluntary. 
These groups were originally recruited to be homeland defense squads in the case of 
a RPF attack, however from the very beginning they espoused extreme forms of anti-
Tutsi discrimination, dehumanization and hatred. 
Later participation in killing squads was not always voluntary. As the genocide 
progressed, killing groups went door-to-door in an attempt to swell their ranks. Some 
communities instituted mandatory shifts at roadblocks or in "hunting parties" patrolling 
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neighborhoods. These individuals did not choose to participate in violent acts, but 
rather joined to avoid social sanctions for non-participation. Others willingly joined 
because of previous group affiliations, social pressure or the hope of political or 
economic gains. As mentioned above, there was also a strong desire for self-
preservation. 
Mass participation outside of the military services necessitated the more "hands-on" 
nature of the killings in Rwanda. While the National Police and Rwandan Army had 
access to automatic weapons, hand grenades and vehicles, the bulk of participants in 
the Rwandan genocide did not have access to or know how to operate such weapons. 
Unlike the technologically advanced containment and killing of the Holocaust, the 
Rwandan genocide was perpetrated using farming tools and traditional weapons such 
as machetes and spears.2 
The number of perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide is still a matter of debate. In an 
extrapolated survey effort, Straus (2004) estimated that there were between 175,000 
and 210,000 active participants in the Rwandan genocide. These numbers represent a 
participation rate of between 14% and 17% of the adult male population in Rwanda at 
the time. More recent figures emerging from the ongoing justice process in Rwanda, 
gacaca, suggest that this number could be as high as 600,000 to 800,000, but these 
numbers include those accused of looting and being present at roadblocks without 
specific charges of killing or assault. 
Perpetrator research in Rwanda has suggested that there is also variation in how and 
at what level people participated in the genocide. Participation ranges from those who 
joined reluctantly or under duress to those who eagerly participated. Bhavnani (2006) 
argues that the majority of participants were closer to reluctant participants than active 
enjoyers of the violence. 
Similarly, Straus' survey (2004) finds that the average number of victims per 
respondent was .7. If Straus' sample is representative then this finding suggests that a 
large proportion of the killings were committed by a small group of individuals while the 
majority of perpetrators committed only a single killing act. 
2 While there has been a heavy focus on the role that machete deaths played in the killings in Rwanda, 
the majority of the larger massacres involved armed national police or army troops and the weapons 
that accompanied those troop movements (Davenport and Slam 2008). For example, pockets of Tutsi 
resistance in Gikongoro and Butare were met with large groups of troops and arms (Human Rights 
Watch, 1999). 
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Conclusions from Rwanda 
It is clear that a certain confluence of structural factors both induces and facilitates the 
participation in genocide. In the Rwandan context the ability to exercise personal 
grievances and to manifest individual fears were directly related to the structure of the 
government and the ongoing civil war. As demonstrated in the research outlined 
above, individual leaders mattered. The variation in violence across Rwanda can be 
explained in part by the variation in leadership style and local leader support or refusal 
to participate in genocidal actions. The importance of the civil war should not be 
overlooked. The structural context of violence and perceived perpetual danger shaped 
the vocabulary of mobilization and generated fears, both justified and not, throughout 
the Hutu population. 
The Rwanda case also demonstrates the latent ability for all individuals to be 
motivated to participate in genocide given the right context. Extreme legacies of 
violence and cultural desensitization were not needed to mobilize perpetrators. The 
majority of the research demonstrates that before the genocide both Hutu and Tutsi 
Rwandans were successfully co-habitating throughout the country. This research 
shows that once the structural context was conducive to participation, people 
participated. These findings challenge existing individual theories regarding deviant 
personalities or personal grievances. Rwandans also participated in the genocide out 
of greed or for personal edification, but there is no evidence to suggest a latent need. 
While participants may have perceived themselves to have economic or political 
grievances they were demographically similar to the rest of the population at the time. 
This finding suggests that the relationship between participation and individual life 
conditions may be more nuanced than originally predicted. 
A review of the current genocide perpetrator literature in the Rwandan context 
suggests that greater attention must be placed on identifying and preventing the 
structural contexts that can lead to genocide. The Rwandan case demonstrates what 
we already know, that groups bind and fear motivates, but it also makes clear that 
mass brutality requires a context of chaos, violence and fear to thrive. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
In applying the theoretical literature of genocide participation to the Rwandan 
genocide, there are a number of additional hypotheses that are generated. The role of 
leadership and desire for personal edification warrant additional attention. Communal 
leadership, much more than state authority, seemed to play a decisive role for 
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individual participation in Rwanda. What are the characteristics of a given community 
leader that makes "following" more likely? The Rwandan case points to the strong role 
of fear in motivating participation, but how were individual reputations developed in the 
first place? 
In addition to a stronger focus on communal leadership in the context of genocide, a 
theory of selective incentives for participation should also be further developed. The 
demographics of Rwandan participants suggest that it is not always the poor and 
deprived who rush to genocide. This is no longer a sufficient explanation. The conflict 
literature includes a well-developed discourse on the utility of public and private goods 
in motivating individuals to participate in acts of rebellion against the state. In a 
perverse way, genocide can be seen as a public good. This would suggest that 
mobil ization would be difficult, but yet it rarely is once the violence has begun. A better 
understanding of selective incentives could help further establish when some countries 
do and are able to resort to genocide while in other countries ethnic tensions are never 
manifested in that way. 
Further research on leadership and incentives is needed to complement our 
understanding of existing theories of participation, however, the Rwandan case also 
highlights some underdeveloped areas of the perpetrator literature. Coercion, for 
example, is rarely discussed in the genocide literature. Current theories assume that 
individuals choose to participate in genocide, but recent research in conflict studies 
highlights the possibility of involuntary participation in violence (Humphreys and 
Weinstein, 2007). Forced recruitment and threats feature prominently in a number of 
recent African conflicts. Additional attention should be paid to forced participation in 
genocide and in Rwanda in particular. 
And finally, the Rwanda case suggests a need to focus on the temporal dimensions of 
participation . Participation is not a single decision, but rather a series of decisions 
made on an almost daily basis. While some perpetrators in the Rwandan genocide 
joined kill ings squads for the duration of the genocide, others participated in single 
events or for limited amounts of time. Why do people come and go? When are group 
ties binding and when do other factors supercede their pull? 
Understanding participation in genocide is essential for future efforts of prevention . 
Perpetrating genocide requires perpetrators. Isolating the root causes of mobilization · 
and participation will aid in the development of policy and programs aimed at halting 
this process. It is clear that this work needs to address both the structure of a 
genocidal state and the individual characteristics of those who join. 
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